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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY 
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(c) . This appeal is from a final 
judgment entered in the Fifth Judicial Circuit Court/ Murray 
Department/ Small Claims Division/ in favor of plaintiff and 
against defendant for $933.29 following trial on November 23/ 
1987. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court committed reversable error 
when it failed to administer an oath or affirmation to Mr, 
Eldredge. 
2. Whether the court erred in allowing Mr. Eldredge to 
testify as to the contents of a damage repair estimate. Stated 
otherwise/ the issue is whether there wa^ any admissable evidence 
as to damages. 
3. Whether the court erred when it awarded damages 
based on the repair estimate alone without evidence as to 
diminution of value; i.e./ whether the court used an erroneous 
measure of damages. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-4-29. Rules of practice and civil 
procedure to apply - Exceptions. 
" . . . The rules of civil procedure shall apply to 
actions commenced in circuit courts except insofar as these 
rules are by their nature clearly inapplicable to circuit 
courts or proceedings therein." 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule l(f)l. Scope. 
"These rules govern proceeding^ in the courts of this 
1 
State/ to the extent and with the exceptions stated in Rule 
1101." 
Utah Rules of Evidence/ Rule 603. Oath or affirmation. 
"Before testifying, every witness shall be required to 
declare that he will testify truthfully, by oath or 
affirmation administered in a form calculated to awaken his 
conscience and impress his mind with his duty to do so." 
Utah Rules of Evidence/ Rule 1101. Applicability of 
Rules. 
"(a) Courts and magistrates. These rules apply to all 
actions and proceedings in the courts of this state except 
as otherwise provided in Subdivision (b). 
(b) Rules inapplicable. The rules (other than with respect 
to privileges) do not apply in the following situations: 
(1) Preliminary questions of fact which are to be 
determined under Rule 104(a); 
(2) Grand jury proceedings; 
(3) Miscellaneous proceedings for extradition/ 
sentencing or granting or revocation of probation/ 
issuance of warrants for arrest/ criminal summonses and 
search warrants and proceedings with respect to release 
on bail or otherwise; 
(4) Contempt proceedings in which the court may act 
summarily." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff and against defendant Taylor D. Carr entered in the 
Small Claims Division of the Murray Department of the Fifth 
Circuit Court. The action was brought to recover for damages to 
plaintiff's automobile allegedly caused by defendant's 
negligence. 
On February 4 or 5, 1986, the car operated by 
defendant-appellant Taylor D. Carr collided with an unoccupied 
2 
car owned by plaintiff-respondent Eldredge Rent A Car. The 
collision occurred on Apricot Avenue in Salt Lake City/ between 
Center Street and Main Street* 
Eldredge Rent A Car filed a Small Claims Affidavit in 
the Small Claims Division of the Murray Department of the Salt 
Lake County Circuit Court/ for damage doqe to the car. The case 
went to trial on November 23/ 1987. 
Apricot Avenue runs east and w^st up a very steep hill. 
Tr. 8:25-9:4. Witness Lorie Wilkinson Torney testified that on 
the morning of the collision/ Apricot Avenue was covered with a 
layer of ice and the ice was covered by a light layer of snow. 
Tr. 9:22-10:12. Ms. Torney testified that on the morning of the 
collision she was driving plaintiff's cart- north on Center Street 
and turned to go east up Apricot. Tr. 9:20-23. She drove about 
two-thirds of the way up Apricot and realized she was not going 
to make it to the top of the hill so she pulled as close as she 
could to the curb and left the car parked on Apricot. Tr. 
4:20-5:12. Lori then left the car on Apricot and walked up the 
hill to her fiance's (now husband's) condominium. Id. By the 
time she returned to the car with her fiance/ Mr. Torney/ the 
collision had occurred. There were no witnesses to the collision 
except Mr. Carr. Tr. 12:13-17. 
Mr. Carr testified that on the morning of the collision 
he pulled east out of the driveway of hi^ condominium. Almost 
immediately his car lost traction and/ despite keeping his foot 
on the brake/ began to slide backward down Apricot where it 
sideswiped plaintiff's parked car as it slid past. Tr. 31:10-18. 
At trial, after Ms- Torney testified, Mr. Eldredge 
sought to introduce a damage repair estimate into evidence. Tr. 
15:14. The Court interrupted Mr. Eldredge and the following 
exchange took place: 
"THE COURT: Mr.' Carrol mean, I don't know if you're 
going to object, but small claims, we usually let hearsay 
in. 
MR. CARR: Well, I—for the record, I will object. 
THE COURT: Great. 
MR. CARR: Based on the fact that it's hearsay and 
there's no qualified witness here to testify concerning the 
estimate. 
MR. ELDREDGE: Well, I'm—I can place myself as a 
qualified witness, because I've done body work for 20—over 
20 years, and I was there when he did write the bid and we 
did discuss it, and as my—my name is on the bottom. 
THE COURT: I'm going to overrule it, because in my 
experience, the small claims is a forum where hearsay is 
allowed, if it appears to be reliable, reliable hearsay." 
(Emphasis added) Tr. 15:17-16:8. 
After overruling the objection, the following exchange 
took place: 
"MR. CARR: I have looked at the pictures and 
estimates. I can't read the estimate, for the most part. 
If—can I ask the witness what some of these words are? 
THE COURT: That's a good idea. Do you want to be 
sworn? Do you want him sworn, I mean he can tell u s — 
MR. CARR: I don't—no, no. I — 
THE COURT: je's been here enough that he can tell us 
the truth." Tr. 18:16-23. 
Thereafter, Mr. Eldredge testified as to the contents 
of the repair estimate prepared by another person whose name was 
not given. Tr. 18:24-20:18. There was no testimony that the 
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estimate constituted a reasonable charge jfor repair of the 
damages incurred. There was no testimony as to the fair market 
value of the car at either the time of the collision or 
thereafter. 
Mr. Eldredge also sought to introduce photographs of 
the car. Mr. Carr objected to introduction of the photographs 
for lack of foundation. Tr. 22:11-13. The court overruled that 
objection (Tr. 22:14-17)/ and then stated: 
"And then on the bid/ Mr. Carr's going to lodge an 
objection that it's hearsay/ and I think it's overruled 
because of the forum we're in." Tr. 22:18-20. 
At the conclusion of all of the evidence/ the court 
entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against Mr. Carr for 
the amount stated on the repair estimate plus a $25 "damage 
appraisal" fee/ plus costs. Tr. 49:8-51i9. Defendant Carr filed 
his Notice of Appeal on December 1/ 1987J 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant-appellant recognizes that the small claims 
courts were established by the legislature to provide speedy 
justice to litigants where the amount of money at issue is 
relatively small. Nevertheless/ the small claim courts are 
divisions of the Circuit Courts and/ except as specifically 
provided otherwise in the Small Claims Cburt Act/ the rules of 
practice and civil procedure apply to actions in the circuit 
courts. Utah Code Ann. § 78-4-29; Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/ 
Rule 1(a); Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 1101(a); Faux v. 
Mickelsen, 725 P.2d 1372, 1374 (Utah 198£). 
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In the instant case, the court allowed Mr. Eldredge to 
testify without being sworn. The court allowed documentary 
evidence which it acknowledged was hearsay to be admitted into 
evidence, thereby depriving Carr of any meaningful cross-
examination on the issue of the damages sought to be imposed 
against him. Except for the admission of hearsay documentary 
evidence, there was no evidence of damages. Finally, apparantly 
because the matter was tried in the Small Claims division of the 
Circuit Court, the court expressly declined to hold plaintiff to 
proof of the proper measure of damages. 
The trial court's misunderstanding of the "informal" 
nature of small claims court procedure resulted in a judgment 
against defendant Carr despite the lack of admissable evidence as 
to damages. 
ARGUMENT 
A. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED MR. ELDREDGE TO 
TESTIFY WITHOUT TAKING AN OATH OR AFFIRMATION 
With a few exceptions not applicable to this case, the 
Utah Rules of Evidence apply to proceedings in all of the courts 
of this State. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 101; Utah Rules of 
Evidence, Rule 1101(a). 
Rule 603 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that 
before testifying, every witness shall be required to declare 
that he will testify truthfully. 
In the instant case, Mr. Eldredge was allowed to 
testify without giving an oath or affirmation that he would 
testify truthfully. The court recognized its duty to swear in 
6 
s the truth". 
rn testimony is not a 
ction to unsworn 
Mr. Eldredge and asked defendant Carr whether he wished Eldredge 
to be sworn. When Mr. Carr was caught off guard and indicated 
some uncertainty (Tr. 18:19-21) the court! cut him off and stated: 
"He's been here enough that he can tell m 
Defendant recognizes that unswoji 
nullity and that failure to raise an objejc 
testimony constitutes a waiver of the irregularity. Larsen v. 
State/ 686 P.2d 583, 587 (Wyo. 1984). Iq this case, however, the 
court started to give Carr an opportunity to either insist that 
Eldredge be sworn or waive the formality, but then cut him off in 
midsentence and unilaterally determined t^ hat Eldredge had "been 
[in court] enough that he could tell the (truth." 
Carr neither intentionally nor inadvertently waived his 
objection to Eldredge testifying without taking an oath or 
affirmation. He was not given an opportunity to state his 
. 1 preference. 
B. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED A DAMAGE REPAIR 
ESTIMATE PREPARED BY A PERSON NOT PRESENT IN COURT TO 
BE ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE 
Carr raised a timely objection to the introduction into 
evidence of a damage repair estimate upoi| which plaintiff relied 
to establish the damages to his vehicle. Tr. 15:19-23. The 
1. The transcript indicates that when a$ked whether he wanted 
Eldredge to be sworn, Carr responded: "I I don't—no, no. I — " . 
Without hearing the response, who is to $ay that Carr was not 
about to say: "I don't know. No, I [want him sworn.]" This 
obviously requires speculation. The point is, Carr was cut-off 
and not given an opportunity to complete|whatever it was he was 
going to say. 
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court acknowledged that the contents of the repair estimate were 
hearsay but overruled the objection on the stated ground that 
"the small claims is a forum where hearsay is allowed/ if it 
appears to be reliable/ reliable hearsay." Tr. 16:6-8; 22:18-20. 
As stated above/ the Rules of Evidence apply to 
proceedings in all of the courts of this State. Defendant Carr 
recognizes that the small claims courts were established by the 
legislature "to make it possible to dispose of certain actions in 
an informal manner from tr.eir inception to their end with the 
sole object of dispensing speedy justice between the parties." 
Faux v. Mickelsen/ 725 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1986). However, the 
legislature has determined what informalities are permissable and 
the introduction of evidence that would be inadmissable in any 
other court is not one of the permitted informalities. The Small 
Claims Court Act/ Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-6-1 et seq./ has dispensed 
with the requirement of formal pleadings/ has provided for the 
acceleration of trial setting/ and has dispensed with the need to 
bring what might/ in another court/ be construed as a compulsory 
counterclaim. The Small Court Act contains no provision which 
can be interpreted as relaxing the rules of evidence. 
In the instant case/ the hearsay evidence offered by 
Eldredge and admitted by the court over objection was the only 
evidence as to damages. Plaintiff needed to prove only two 
elements to establish its claim—negligence and damages. The 
only other evidence that tended to establish damages were 
photographs of plaintiff's car; and there was no testimony that 
8 
the damage shown on the photographs was paused by the impact 
2 
between Carr's car and plaintifffs car. 
The introduction of the damage repair estimate deprived 
Carr of the right to conduct any meaningful cross-examination. 
The person who prepared the estimate was not present to testify 
that the estimate was reasonable/ or that he in fact repaired the 
car for the charges stated on the estimate (and not a lesser 
amount)/ or to express an opinion that the damages listed on the 
repair estimate were caused by the collision. 
In Sevy v. Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company/ 8 Utah 
2d 321, 334 P.2d 554 (1959), the Supreme Court specifically held 
that it was error for the trial court to admit testimony as to 
the contents of a written appraisal of repair costs where the 
witness was not qualified as an expert ar^ d did not prepare the 
appraisal. 
Rule 602/ Rules of Evidence/ provides that a witness 
may not testify to a matter unless eviderice is introduced 
sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of 
the matter. Even assuming that some relaxation of the Rules of 
Evidence is permissable in small claims Courts/ defendant 
suggests that parties must come to court prepared to present at 
least some admissable evidence as to the necessary elements of 
2. Mr. Eldredge testified that when he leased the car to Lorie 
Torney it had no damage and when she retyrned the car it was 
damaged. Tr. 20:20-22. But Ms. Torney (Sid not testify that 
there was no other damage done to the car either before or after 
the collision involving defendant. 
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the cause of action upon which they seek to recover, or take the 
risk that appropriate objections will be raised. The valid 
objective of providing an easy means for plaintiffs to present 
their cases does not justify the imposition of unwarranted 
judgments against defendants, no matter how small the amount of 
money involved. 
C. 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES WHEN THERE WAS NO 
EVIDENCE OF THE DIMINUTION OF VALUE OF THE DAMAGED VEHICLE 
Generally, the measure of damages to an automobile is 
(1) the fair market value of the property before being damaged 
less the fair market value of the property after being damaged, 
or (2) the reasonable repair cost of the automobile, whichever is 
less. Sevy v. Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company, supra, 334 
P.2d 554. In the instant case, there was no evidence of the fair 
market value of plaintifffs car either before or after the 
accident. Such a measure of damages is sound. A defendant 
should not be required to pay repair costs if the cost to repair 
a car is greater than the financial loss sustained by the 
property owner. A small "parking lot ding" may not result in any 
decrease in value to a vehicle, but might cost hundreds to 
repair. 
Defendant recognizes that under special circumstances 
repair cost may be the only evidence of damage to personal 
property available to a plaintiff. See, e.g., Ault v. Dubois, 
739 P.2d 1117 (Utah App. 1987). However, when the personal 
property is a motor vehicle, and when the plaintiff is in the 
automobile business as in the instant case, no good reason is 
10 
apparant why the plaintiff should not be (required to show that 
diminution in value is greater than the cost of repair before 
being allowed to recover cost of repair ^s his damage. 
In the instant case/ defendant Carr appropriately 
argued that plaintiff had not proven dimi 
response the court stated: 
nution in value. In 
THE COURT: And I just think in this case that Mr. 
Eldredge has a right, as most of usjdo, to go out and repair 
his car . . . . And I understand your legal theory, that he 
has to prove value before and value after, and I understand 
your point that the Court here ought to be bound to that 
measure of proof. I!m finding specifically for the small 
claims proceedings, that Mr. Eldredge has proved a fair and 
reasonable loss, irrespective of what All [sic] v. Duboise 
may show in terms of esoteric measures of damage, and I 
would be happy to say that for the record." (Emphasis 
added) Tr. 50:24-51:9 
While the legislature has relaxed some procedural 
requirements in small claims court actiohs, the Small Claims 
Court Act contains nothing modifying the rules of substantive 
law, including the rules relating to measure of damages. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on all of the above/ and on the record below/ 
defendant respectfully submits that the judgment entered in the 
trial court was based solely on inadmissable evidence, and that 
the evidence submitted was insufficient to support a finding of 
damages. The trial court's judgment should be reversed and 
judgment should be entered for defendant because there was no 
evidence of damages. 
Dated this lb day of March, 1988. 
Taylor D. Carr 
Steven H. Lybbert 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant 
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1 THE COURT: Mr, Carr, any questions o f — 
2 And your name today is? 
3 MR. CARR: Yes, your Honor. 
4 THE WITNESS: Lorie Torney. 
5 THE COURT: Torney? 
6 THE WITNESS: T-o-r-n-e-y. 
7 THE COURT: All right. 
9 MR. CARR: I'm not sure of yoiir procedure here, your 
9 Honor. Do I stand when I cross-examine '(witnesses? 
10 THE COURT: Do whatever you like. If you want to 
U stand and pull that out and look real gcpod, or you can just 
12 sit down. 
I I 
13 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
14 BY MR. CARR: I 
15 Q Lorie, you and I were neighbors, to a certain 
16 extent, weren't we? 
A Uh huh. 
Q And how long had you been associated with Dick Torney, 
a« he lived at that condominium addres^ where we live? 
go A Two years. 
Q So you were well familiar with the situation— 
A Uh huh. I 
Q —of that area? 
A I worked there for a year, so, uh huh. 
25 Q Now, Apricot Avenue runs ea^ t and west; is that 
>SOCIATEI) PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
420 KEARNS BUILDING 
SAtT LAKE CITY. UTAH B410|l 
1
 correct? 
2
 A Yes. 
3
 Q And would you describe it as a very steep hill? 
4
 A Yes. 
5
 Q Would you describe it with respect to other street, 
6
 highways of Salt Lake City as a very narrow street? 
7
 I A No. I don't think so. I think) it's an average 
street. 8 
9
 J Q Do you think that Apricot Avenge is wide enough so 
10
 I that you could have cars parked on each qurb, plus have 
11
 | vehiciklar traffic pass each other going qast and west? 
12
 I A Not—not two cars, no. 
13
 I Q All right. So, there's not room to park cars on each 
side, plus have vehicular traffic passing? 
A Not on both sides, but there w4s no car on the 
16
 I other side. 
17 Q Now, on that particular morning, February 4th, 1986, 
14 
15 
24 
25 
18
 I as you turned on to Apricot from Center Street, which direction 
19 had you been coming from on Center Street? 
20 A I'd been going north, I'd been coming from the 
21
 south going north. 
22 Q Okay. Describe the road condition on Apricot, as you 
23 J turned to go east, up the hill? 
A It was snowy. It was snowy. 
Q Was it deep snow? 
— - - • • , , , , , . , i . . . . 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
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THE COURT: For today, I am. 
MR. ELDREDGE: Okay. Should we just call her up a,nd 
have her testify, then? 
THE COURT: That's a good idea+ 
MR. ELDREDGE: Can you come upland testify, plea.se, 
Lorie? 
LORIE WILKINSON/ 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the pla.in.tiff in. this 
matter, after having been first duly sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
THE COURT: If you'll take the stand right here. 
And then, Mr. Eldredge, just a^k her a couple of 
questions, you know, as much as you think, and then Mr. Carr 
can ask her some. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. ELDREDGE: I 
Q Lorie, can you tell us—tell the Judge, please, what 
happened on or about February 4th, 1986, when the car was 
damaged on Apricot Avenue? 
A Sure. I was driving east on Apricot Avenue, and I 
got about three—well, let's see, about two-thirds of the way 
up the street and it was a snowy day, and I realized that I 
could not make it all the way up, so,.. 
THE COURT: What day was this? This is quite a 
25 I while ago then, huh? 
ASSOCIATE!) PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
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THE WITNESS: Uh huh. 
THE COURT: February 4th? 
THE WITNESS: Uh huh. And so l| got about two-thirds 
of the way up the street, and realized thjat I was not going to 
make it to the top of the—to the top of the hill, so I pulled 
over as far as I could, there was a snowfcjank probably about 
three feet to the curb, two feet to the durb, so I kinda skid 
into the snowbank. And I did not feel confident enough to back 
the car down the hill on the snowy day, 'cause I didn't want to 
slide out into the street. So, I thought that I'd walk up the 
hill to get my husband, which was my fiarice at the time, 'cause 
I was taking him to the airport. 
So, I went in the house, got him, I probably wasn't 
parked there more than four minutes, we cfame out. And in the 
meantime, Mr. Carr had pulled—started driving down the street 
and had slid into the car. 
THE COURT: Well, maybe so I'lJ understand, you were 
in the house four minutes— 
THE WITNESS: Uh huh. 
THE COURT: —and then when yot|i come back, what do 
you see? 
THE 
THE 
those things? 
THE 
WITNESS: That he had slid into the car. 
COURT: I mean, how do you I know it's him and 
WITNESS: ,'Cause he was th( 
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1 when you came out? 
2
 A Uh huh, sideways. 
3 Q When you say sideways, what do yoii mean by that? 
4 A Well# I mean, you—it was obvious that you were 
5 coming down the hill. 
6 Q There's no doubt I came down the hill; but do you 
I 
7 know whether I came down the hill frontwards or backwards? 
8 A Well, it appeared to me that you came down 
9
 backwards. 
1° Q Yes. 
11 A I mean—no, that you came down frontwards, I mean. 
12 i mean, it appeared to me that you came down frontwards. 
13 Q But you—you didn't see it happen? You didn't see 
14
 me come down there? 
15 A No. I was not, I was in the housje, so I did not. 
16 Q Mr. Torney didn't see me come doWn the hill? 
17 A No. 
18 j Q Okay. Now, with respect to our brief conversation 
on that day, it was not a, what you would describe as an 
20 I argument of any kind, would you? 
21 I A No. No. 
Q It was something like, well, we know each other, and 
23 I we'll take care of our own problem; wasn't it something to that 
24 effect? 
25 A It was, we know each other, we wc^n't—we don't need 
i - • • . ••• • i . i i — i . , , _ _ , 
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condominium complex, located in this approximate position. She 
pulled off Center Street, got a couple of car lengths or more, 
maybe three car lengths up the road, and then came—became 
completely tractionless. j 
Now, at that point, she knew the condition of the 
road, she knew that it wasn't just a white powder over the 
concrete. Instead of backing—simply backing off on to Center 
Street, to bring her car out of the position of danger, she 
left it there. 
I came out of my place to go to work, and as usual, 
I pulled out here, saw the light, white covering of snow and 
drove in this direction. I didn't get mqre than straightened 
out, before I became completely tractioniess, myself. At that 
point, there was nothing I could do, my car began sliding 
backwards. All I could do at that point is hold onto the 
wheel, put my foot on the brake and say, why couldn't she 
move that car out of the way, as I see dLtfi coming up, behind 
me. 
The right front of my car strucbk the left front corner 
of her car, in a position similar to this, as I slid backwards. 
There was absolutely no way I could have avoided that. Now— 
THE COURT: Excuse me. So, you're saying that your 
vehicle slid in a straight, unimpeded straight free fall? 
MR. CARR: Basically straight,! slightly tilted toward 
the right. 
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I have for this 
A Okay. It was on the driver's s|ide, okay? On the 
left side. 
Q Are you really sure about that?| 
A As I recall. 
Q Okay. Can you describe— 
MR. CARR: Well, I guess I can pio this better with 
another witness, your Honor. That's all 
witness. 
THE COURT: Before you go, anything else, 
Mr. Eldredge? 
MR. ELDREDGE: Not right now. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Why donl't you step down. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
MR. ELDREDGE: Okay. We've gotl an estimate here from 
an independent damage appraiser that showls the damage to our 
car, this is written b y — 
THE COURT: Mr. Carr, I mean, ij don't know if you're 
going to object, but small claims, we usually let hearsay in. 
MR. CARR: Well, I—for the recprd, I will object. 
THE COURT: Great. 
MR. CARR: Based on the fact thbt it's hearsay and 
there's no qualified witness here to testp 
estimate. 
ify concerning the 
MR. ELDREDGE: Well, I'm—I can 
qualified witness, because I've done body 
place myself as a 
work for 20—over 
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THE COURT: Now, on the appraisa|l, I mean, you just 
say, you know, you talked to him, showed him the car and that's 
hearsay, but we have to let them in in smajll claims, because 
that's why we have the system. 
Your witness is back? 
MRS, TORNEY: They sent him to 7-Eleven, they wouldn't 
let him use the phone out here because they didn't have a pay 
phone, so they sent him to the 7-Eleven. (He needed to make a 
conference call real quick, so... 
THE COURT: What a lucky guy. 
MRS. TORNEY: Pardon? 
THE COURT: So, he'll be back i4 a minute? 
MRS. TORNEY: I guess, yeah. 
THE COURT: Do you want to turn it off for a minute? 
(Off the record.) 
MR. CARR: I have looked at the pictures and estimates 
I can't read the estimate, for the most p^rt. If—can I ask 
the witness what some of these words are? 
THE COURT: That's a good idea. Do you want to be 
sworn? Do you want him sworn, I mean he cpan tell us — 
MR. CARR: I don't—no, no. I-+ 
THE COURT: He's been here enough that he can tell 
us the truth, 
MR. CARR: What's this last item down here? 
MR. ELDREDGE: That's remove and replace, that would 
vssou vn:n PROITSSION \L RI:P<JRTI:RS 
420 KEARNS BUM DING 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84101 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MR. ELDREDGE: 2-4 of '86— 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. ELDREDGE:—is when he came out and wrote a bid 
on the car. 
THE COURT: Okay. And who took the pictures? 
MR. ELDREDGE: Jim Carey, the man who wrote the bid, 
THE COURT: And do they—do they-—as you look at 
them, do they reflect the damage you saw on the day before? 
MR. ELDREDGE: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. CARR: Your Honor, I object to the pictures on the 
same basis that I do to the estimate, on the basis of fact 
that there's a lack of foundation. I 
THE COURT: Well, clearly, on the pictures, there 
appears to be a foundation, he says that they reflect 
accurately what he saw. I think that there's adequate 
foundation. I 
And then on the bid, Mr. Carr's going to lodge an 
objection that it's hearsay, and I think it's overruled 
because of the forum we're in. 
MR. ELDREDGE: Okay. 
THE COURT: So, I can see those. 
You only had one bid? 
MR. ELDREDGE: Yes. The reason We had one bid, is 
because at one time, like I testified, we thought there was 
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1
 Mario Andretti, or somebody of that nature. And once I got 
2 into that— 
3
 THE COURT: Or Paul Newman. 
4
 MR. CARR: —uncontrollable slide, there was nothing 
5
 I could do, and I'm just urging this Court to find that this 
6 in fact was an unavoidable accident. 
7
 THE COURT: Fair enough. 
8
 Well, you do make a convincing case, Mr. Carr, but 
9
 [ here's how I see that happen. I see a car in essentially the 
same kind of situation coming up the hill and they're able to 
stop, and not go down. Now, I don't know what it was in your 
12
 I situation that made it different. You've indicated you don't 
13
 I know, and I have no feel, but as I see the reasonable person on 
that road, they could have controlled that stop. And for that 
reason, I think then that your conduct did dip—as you say, 
dip below the standard of a reasonable man. I think once you 
it. 17
 drive it, you've got to be able to control 
18 Another driver in a very—in exactly the same situation 
19
 was able to stop the car and not move it further down the 
20
 hill, and I think that you're held to that standard. I find 
21 you at fault * 
22 I think the damages that Mr. Eldredge has presented 
23 are appropriate, except for the $54. I reduce his base amount 
24
 J then by that 54. I find him in at $908.54, the cost of the 
repair plus the appraisal cost, the $24.75 for Court costs, and 
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A There was deep snow to the side of the hill, there 
was light covered snow on the road. 
Q There was a light-white covering of snow over the 
road— 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Uh huh. 
— w a s there not? 
Yes. 
And underneath that light covering of snow, there was 
some real slick black ice, wasn't there? 
A Uh huh. It was slick. 
Q You have to answer yes, please. 
A Yes. 
Q Thank you. In fact, when Mr. Torney came out o f — 
of the condominium and stepped upon the road— 
A He slipped. 
Q — h e slipped and slid all the way down Apricot, 
didn't he? 
A Uh huh. Yeah, he did. Yes. 
Q N o w — 
THE COliRT: You didn't laugh, did you? 
THE WITNESS: Uh huh. 
THE COURT: Did you? 
MR. CARR: I certainly didn't laugh, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, no. You're not in the mood to, 
but--and she's not—she shouldn't have. B u t — 
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1 20 years, and I was there when he did write the bid and we did 
2 discuss it, and as my—my name is on the bottom— 
3 THE COURT: He wants—he wants to make his objection 
4 for the record. 
5 MR. ELDREDGE: Okay. 
6 THE COURT: I'm going to overrule it, because in my 
7 experience, the small claims is a forum where hearsay is allowed, 
9 if it appears to be reliable, reliable hearsay. 
9 MR. ELDREDGE: This is written by Jim Carey's damage 
10 auto appraisal service, he writes for Farmers1 Insurance when 
11 they're too busy, and also he does write for several other 
12 insurance companies. These are pictures that he took on the 
13 date of the estimate here. Shall I show these to Mr. Carr or 
14 to yourself, or whomever? 
15 THE COURT: It's up to you. 
16 MR. ELDREDGE: Who would, like to see them? 
17 MR. CARR: I'd like to see them. 
18 MR. ELDREDGE: Okay. 
19 MR. CARR: Thank you. 
20 MR» ELDREDGE: I get a chuckle every time I come in 
here. 
THE COURT: The theory behind it/ Mr, Eldred.ge, if 
23 I you're going to offer them to be admitted, then he should look 
24 at them first, and then on pictures, you have to lay some 
25 foundation as to whether or not the car—the pictures reflect 
21 
22 
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1
 the damage justice. 
2
 MR. CARR: And you have charged three hours for the 
3
 left rear door? 
4
 MR. ELDREDGE: That's correct. That's damage along 
5
 the* side here. 
6 MR. CARR: Does that show that in the picture? 
7
 MR. ELDREDGE: I think it probably shows that there's 
8 a crease right through here, that's right tjhrough there. You 
9
 I can see there's a concave right above this line there. 
MR. CARR: Okay. And you've changed three hours for 
11 that? And you've — 
12 MR. ELDREDGE: That's correct. 
13 MR. CARR: You allege that that was done in this 
14
 incident? 
15
 MR. ELDREDGE: That's correct. 
16
 MR. CARR: Uh huh. 
*
7
 MR. ELDREDGE: That was down the whole side of the 
10 
18 
25 
car 
19 MR. CARR: But you didn't see the incident, did you? 
20 MR. ELDREDGE: No, I did not. All's I know is that 
21 when the car went out, there was no damage on the car. When 
22 the car come back, this is the damage that was on the car. And 
23 as far as the tires on the car, the car when it went out on 
24 J rent, had 8,000 miles, so the tires, I would think would be 
fairly good. The car was a new car. 
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1 I add them up, I get 9 3 3.29. 
2 Now, Mr. Eldredge, my impression is, given Mr. Carr's— 
3 and I'm not—but his experience, he may well appeal this, I'm 
4 not arguing he will or won't, but you're both going to receive 
5 copies of the judgment, and then if he hasn't appealed within 
5 five days, he knows then the judgment is final, so I would 
7 hold getting too excited until you saw what happened within 
Q the five-day period. Okay? 
9 MR. CARR: On the record, your Honor, may I ask you to 
10 respond to my objections to the— 
H THE COURT: Yes. I think that's important for the 
12 record. Let me just, for the record, I have five pictures 
13 presented by the defendant which are, what you claim the position 
14 of the car, and I've heard testimony that's different, and I 
15 can make some facts on that, and then I see the pictures on the 
15 damage. I'm going to keep them all, not—just when I see an 
17 attorney who has done as much preparation, I sense maybe you 
18 want to look at an appeal. So, ask your questions, and then I 
I 
19 can make my findings for you. 
20 MR. CARR: My question is, what is your finding with 
2i respect to my objection to the fact that they did not prove— 
22 THE COURT: Prove dimunition of value? 
03 MR. CARR: Dimunition of value, yeah. 
24 THE COURT: And I just think in this case that 
25 Mr. Eldredge has a right, as most of us do, to go out and 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
420 -EARNS BUILDING C A 
SALT L-i-E CITY UTAH 84101 5 0 
L3 
1 repair his car, and that you caused the damage that he had 
2 repaired at a fair and reasonable price. Arid I understand 
3 your legal theory, that he has to prove valule before and value 
Court here ought 
inding specifically 
4 atter, and I understand your point that the 
5 to be bound to that measure of proof. I'm fj 
6 lor the small claims proceedings, that Mr. Eldredge has proved 
I 
7 a fair and reasonable loss, irrespective of what All vs. 
8 Duboise may show in terms of esoteric measurbs of damage, and 
1 
9 I would be happy to say that for the record. 
to MR. CARR: Thank you. Where do we 
[1 transcript? 
order the 
12 THE COURT: And I'm not sure on how an appeal works 
but can you check with Dorothy, and if Dorothy can't answer 
14 I you, Jay can, Jay or Jerry, they're both behind there, and 
[5 they 111 lay out exactly how you do it. 
L6 MR. CARR: Thank you. 
[7 THE COURT: Thank you all for your I participation. 
L8 M R . E L D R E D G E : T h a n k y o u , y o u r Honct>r 
I 
9 (Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
10 
> 1 
12 
13 
14 
25 
* * * 
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